Quidditas
Volume 41

Article 7

2020

Explanations and Justifications of War in the British Kingdoms in
the Seventeenth Century
Roger B. Manning
Cleveland State University

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/rmmra
Part of the Comparative Literature Commons, History Commons, Philosophy Commons, and the
Renaissance Studies Commons

Recommended Citation
Manning, Roger B. (2020) "Explanations and Justifications of War in the British Kingdoms in the
Seventeenth Century," Quidditas: Vol. 41 , Article 7.
Available at: https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/rmmra/vol41/iss1/7

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at BYU ScholarsArchive. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Quidditas by an authorized editor of BYU ScholarsArchive. For more information, please
contact scholarsarchive@byu.edu, ellen_amatangelo@byu.edu.

Quidditas 41 (2020)

134

Explanations and Justifications of War
in the British Kingdoms in the Seventeenth Century
Roger B. Manning
Cleveland State University

The influence of Machiavelli on English and Scottish political discourse can be

detected not just on politicians and military men, but also among clerics and
the well educated elite– even when they do not cite him directly. In England
and Scotland, as in mainland European countries, Machiavellian discourse
placed war at the center of discussion. Some justified their bellicosity in the
secularized language of Roman historians and Italian humanists and thought that
since war was the main theme of history and could be regarded as an inevitable
phenomenon, England might as well profit by it. This necessarily brought
England into conflict with the Spanish in the Low Countries, on the high seas and
in the Indies. The discourse of aristocratic swordsmen also reflected the influence
of Tacitus, but in order to recruit followers for their military adventures, they
looked to public places such as the London theaters, which produced plays about
the military heroes of classical antiquity as well as relying on conscription from
the county trained bands. While aristocratic swordsmen saw foreign wars as an
opportunity to win martial fame and fortune, popular discourse had not yet been
secularized to the same degree, and divines and preachers were called upon to
help provide justifications for war in religious terms that the commonalty could
better understand.
The ambition of the world is such that it is impossible for a realm or dominion
long to continue in quietness and safeguard where the defense of the sword and
martial feats of war is not exercised and practiced with discipline.
Giles Clayton, The Approved Order of Martiall Discipline, sig. A3v.1
Great empires rarely enjoy peace. If there is no foreign foe to engage them, their
sword is turned upon themselves; and like healthy bodies free from external
menace, they collapse from their own excess of strength.
Sir Thomas Craig, De Unione Regnorum Britanniae Tractatus, 470-1.
War is a kind of execution of public justice and a means of maintaining right.
William Gouge, God’s Three Arrowes: Plague, Famine, and the
Sword, 214.

War was endemic in Europe in the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries; it dominated men’s lives, and it also came to be regarded
as inevitable.2 It was thought to be ordained by Divine Providence
because of man’s sinfulness, and was therefore part of the human
condition. War was also a theater for demonstrating courage and

1 Compare Lupton, A Warre-like Treatise of the Pike, 16: “ ‘Tis hard for a state to be long
in safety when the helmet and the musket are cashiered. ... How quickly will effeminacy
and cowardice surprise a nation without exercises or employments for war.”
2 Hale, “Armies, Navies and the Art of War,” 171; Nolan, “The Militarization of the Elizabethan State,” 391-420; Carlton, This Seat of Mars, xvi-xviii, 63-4; Manning, War and
Peace in the Western Political Imagination, 184-86 .
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validating honor, but these chivalric concepts were being overtaken
by a view of war as an instrument of the dynastic state with specific
political and military objectives.3 Despite the atypical examples of
James VI and I and Charles I, who tried to avoid armed conflict,
other European monarchs and their governments were organized
for making war, and this functional disposition did much to shape
the early modern state. War had become a powerful institution in
the seventeenth century– sometimes more powerful than monarchy
itself– such as when Albrecht von Wallenstein raised armies from his
own resources and made policy independently of the king-emperor,
but generally armies became better disciplined in the seventeenth
century and more amenable to royal control.4 Kings who made war,
led their soldiers into battle and acquired martial glory continued
to be more highly regarded than those who valued and worked for
peace, and this remained true to the end of the eighteenth century. As
long as diplomacy remained in its formative stage, war continued to
be the usual way of settling disputes and provided the more plausible
form of discourse for those bred in courts and camps.5 Certainly,
in England, diplomacy was a language more suited to gownsmen
and clerics, and just as swordsmen did not regard it as appropriate
to have their disputes adjudicated by gownsmen, so it was more
usual to settle disputes between monarchs and republics by resort
to arms.
The climate of war
During the period from 1585 (when an English expedition
under the command of Robert Dudley, earl of Leicester, went to the
aid of the Dutch in their struggle to be free of Spain) until 1702 (the
death of the soldier-king William II and III), Europe experienced
only three years of peace. The Three Kingdoms of England, Ireland
3 Clark, Waging War, 11-12.
4 Manning, “The Jacobean Peace: The Irenic Policy of James VI & I,” 149-189; Shifflett,
Stoicism, Politics and Literature in the Age of Milton, 11-12.
5 Black (ed.), “Introduction,” in The Origins of War in Early Modern Europe, 10. Cf.
also Keegan, A History of Warfare, ch. 1 for an argument concerning why war was not an
extension of politics by other means in the early modern period.
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and Scotland were at war with foreign enemies for half of that time,
and the English conquest of Ireland was more or less continuous.6
However, even during periods of formal peace or truce, such as the
Nine Years Truce during the Eighty Years War or the brief cessation
of hostilities intervening between the Nine Years War and the War of
Spanish Succession, as Thomas Hobbes observed in the middle of
the century, the certain knowledge that an enemy intended to make
war upon another state constituted a climate of war that cannot be
considered a state of peace.7 Consequently, peace was difficult to
imagine during the seventeenth century.8 Outside of a few humanist
scholars of the sixteenth century and certain sects such as the later
Anabaptists and the Quakers, few people questioned the legitimacy
of rulers settling their disputes by war. Discussion was generally
limited to examining the criteria for a just war, and most Protestant
and Catholic divines upheld the idea that the Lord was a God of
Battles in the Hebrew mode.9
A distinction between public and private war only began to
emerge in about the middle of the sixteenth century, and as long as
monarchs and martialists viewed international relations in terms of
personal honor and glory, the distinction was bound to remain fuzzy.
Given the widespread fashion for dueling– often involving multiple
combats– it should cause no surprise that wars were so frequent
and numerous as to make it difficult for historians to count them–
especially if one adds in civil conflicts.10 As was the case with the
feud and the duel, the chief reason for monarchs going to war was to
seek revenge or redress for the injured rights of the aggrieved party.11
6 Manning, Swordsmen: The Martial Ethos in the Three Kingdoms, 1-2; Trim, “The Context of War and Violence in Sixteenth-Century English Society,” 233-55; id., “Introduction,” The Chivalric Ethos and the Development of Military Professionalism, 1-38; Smuts,
“Organized Violence in the Elizabethan Monarchical Republic,” 418-43.
7 Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. Pogson Smith, I.13 (p. 96).
8 Which may, perhaps, explain why Lowe’s Imagining Peace, stops in the early Elizabethan period.
9 Parker, “Early Modern Europe,”42; Jorgenson, “Theoretical Views of War in Elizabethan
England,” 472; Luciani, “Ralegh’s Discourse of War and Machiavelli’s Discorsi,” 122-3.
10 Manning, Swordsmen, 1-8, 141-244.
11 Redlich, De Praeda Militari: Looting and Booty, 1500-1800, 2-3.
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Nor did these wars undertaken by princes necessarily displease their
subjects. Military events and battles such as the Armada or the taking
of Boulogne in 1544 remained an important part of popular memory
in England. The English people took pride in the victories of their
rulers over foreign nations, and these also included the victories
achieved by the Lord Protector Oliver Cromwell, if almanacs are
any guide to public opinion. References to rebellions successfully
quashed also served as a reminder of the king’s ability to defeat
his enemies. War generally enjoyed popular support in Elizabethan
England if it was fought to repel foreign invasions or to support the
Protestant cause.12
Although theories justifying the right of the nobility to resist
unjust, tyrannical or ineffectual rulers persisted during the sixteenth
and seventeenth centuries, most political theorists, such as the
Flemish Justus Lipsius and William Fulbeck, the Elizabethan legal
writer and playwright, insisted that only the prince possessed the
authority to declare war. Sir Robert Filmer stated in his Patriarcha,
or the Natural Power of Kings (1680) that the authority to declare
war was one of the most important attributes of sovereignty.
Lipsius, who brought a more ethical concern to these matters than
Machiavelli, thought that the just causes of war were limited to the
invasion of one’s country, defense of religious faith and the common
security of the realm. Peace was the purpose of war, but peace could
not be enjoyed without making war, and a people must always be
prepared to go to war to enjoy peace.13
Swordsmen continued to regard the pursuit of war as
necessary to preserve the privileges of the aristocracy and to provide
a theater for the demonstration of noble honor and valor. Despite the
persistence of such chivalric values, however, they did not employ the
language of chivalry to justify war. The justification of war to those
12 Capp, Astrology and the Popular Press, 218; Younger, War and Politics in the Elizabethan Counties, 59-61.
13 Scott, “The Law of War: Grotius, Sidney and Locke and the Political Theory of Rebellion,” 565-85; Lipsius, Sixe Bookes of Politickes, 130, 181; Baumgartner, Declaring War
in Early Modern Europe, 87, 94.
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outside of their own estate was something which military aristocrats
usually were prepared to leave to the numerous divines who were
bellicose enough to undertake this task. In the late sixteenth and
early seventeenth centuries, the amateur swordsman, who saw war as
a chivalric sport, was gradually being displaced by the professional
martialist who regarded war as an occupation. Professional soldiers
were accused of trying to keep wars going because they did not like
being out of employment.14 For their part, the martialists adopted
Machiavellian language to argue for military preparedness and the
special status of the military profession as a means of preserving
the peace and integrity of the political community. One of the main
thrusts of Machiavellian thought was to make war once again a
central concern of political thought and civic life. Basing his ideas
upon Roman practice as discussed by Cicero, Machiavelli was an
advocate of preemptive war. This meant that the ultimate decision
of when to declare war was in the hands of the prince. For their part,
the martialists never tired of repeating the maxim that the exercise
of arms kept a nation from becoming soft.15 Among the English
military writers who disseminated Machiavellian ideas on the
justification of war were Thomas and Dudley Digges and Barnaby
Rich. The former two were fruitful inventors of aphorisms such as
“no prince or state doth gain or save by giving small entertainment
unto soldiers” and “war [is] sometimes less hurtful and more to be
wished in a well governed state than peace.” The latter was justified
by arguing in a Tacitean vein that
it may appear that in a just and good quarrel, which cannot likely want
a war wisely managed, [it] cannot but be infinitely profitable. I think that
there is none but honors his king, wishes well his country or desires fame, but
will prefer the shedding of blood to procure his king’s honor, his country’s
safety or his own reputation before the sordid sparing, lazy living or foolish
delaying... of blind men.16
14 Hathaway, “Blood is their Argument: Men of War and Soldiers in Shakespeare and
Others,” 84-5; Manning, An Apprenticeship in Arms, ch. 7.
15 Hale, “Incitement to Violence? English Divines on the Theme of War,” 369-99; Ferguson, The Chivalric Tradition in Renaissance England, 1986), 105; Mallett, “The Theory
and Practice of Warfare in Machiavelli’s Republic,” 174; Baumgartner, Declaring War in
Early Modern Europe, 55.
16 Thomas and Dudley Digges, Foure Paradoxes, or Politique Discourses... concerning
Militarie Discipline,1, 96-8.
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The exposure of the educated classes of the British Isles to
Roman history in the works of writers such as Tacitus and Seneca also
inculcated republican sentiments, and it led to a characteristically
Neo-Stoic acceptance of violence and war as an inevitable part of
life. Seneca speaks of life as warfare and praises athletics and the
exercise of arms as a worthy preparation for war: “valiant soldiers
glory in their wounds, and joyfully show the blood that runneth
from them, if spent in a good cause.”17 The classical Roman concept
of peace assumed that peace must be preceded by victory which
assumes the existence of war. Roman coins often depict Pax linked
to Victoria and wielding a sword and shield or displaying battle
trophies. Peace was something to be imposed, hence the motto
Mars pacifer. The views expressed by Roman poets do not differ
significantly from the values expressed by the mottos on Roman
coins.18 The Roman way of war, according to Machiavelli, was to
send an overwhelming force against the enemy to secure a decisive
victory quickly, and then plant colonies to insure peace. Machiavelli
himself had little experience of warfare and had never served in a
large campaign, yet war and the military world are at the heart of
civic life in his writings and promoted civic virtue and patriotism.
The responsibility for promoting the exercise of arms fell on both
the prince and the citizenry, and the defense of the state could not
be left to mercenary soldiers.19 Having surveyed all of the empires
of the ancient world, Leonard and Thomas Digges concluded that
the possession of or lack of martial skills explains their success in
establishing monarchies and empires– or their failure in the same
endeavors.20
Barnaby Rich, a veteran of the Marian and Elizabethan wars
17 Seneca, “De Providentia,” IV.4, 504, quoted in Shifflett, Stoicism, Politics and Literature in the Age of Milton, 17; Skinner, “Classical Liberty, Renaissance Translation and
the English Civil War,” 308-43; Lake, “From Leicester his Commonwealth to Sejanus his
Fall,” 128-29.
18 Hutton, Themes of Peace in Renaissance Poetry, 17, 303.
19 Machiavelli, The Discourses, ed. Crick, 291-2; Mallet, “The Theory and Practice of
Warfare in in Machiavelli’s Republic,” 173-80.
20 Digges, An Arithmeticall Militaire Treatise named Stratioticos, preface.

Quidditas 41 (2020)

140

in France, Ireland and the Netherlands, generally preferred to leave
detailed explanations of the justification of war to the divines, but
he could not resist telling his readers that it was the “sins of the
people” which furnished the first signs of war; and an abundance
of sin “unsheathed the soldier’s sword.” From the Old Testament,
Rich learned that wars were sometimes more pleasing to God than
peace, and from the classical writers it could be learned that “Divine
Plato praised this art of war and commanded that children should
learn it as soon as they be of the ability to become soldiers.”21
Elizabethan writers and divines frequently drew upon St
Augustine’s doctrine that “war is a scourge of the wrath of God.”
In a sermon preached at Paul’s Cross in 1627, William Hampton
declared that the sins of the English people were so great that God
must surely punish them with a visitation of war.22 Thomas Scott,
the Puritan preacher who published a series of sermons attacking the
proposal for a Spanish marriage for Charles, prince of Wales, had
sought refuge in the Netherlands to escape censorship. He settled
in Utrecht where he served as chaplain to the English garrison.
Scott was one of many Puritan preachers who seized upon the
‘Fatal Vesper’ of 26 October 1623, when a gallery in the Blackfriars
collapsed under the weight of a Catholic congregation listening
to a priest preaching a sermon and killing more than 90 persons
as a providential punishment for papists who refused to become
Protestants.23 Following the Restoration, Thomas Gumble, General
Monck’s chaplain, continued to believe that the British civil wars
were visited upon the people of England and Scotland because they
did “not know how to prize their peace and plenty with thankfulness
to God and obedience to their king; for murmuring and discontent
under God’s mercies procures the greatest judgments.”24 Although
21 Rich, The Fruites of long Experience, 3-4 (dedication is to Henry, prince of Wales); id.,
Allarme to England, sigs. Aiijr & Bijr (dedication is to Sir Christopher Hatton, captain of
the Royal Guard).
22 de Somogyi, Shakespeare’s Theatre of War, 17; Hampton, A Proclamation of Warre
from the Lord of Hosts,18 (dedicated to Charles Howard, earl of Nottingham).
23 Walsham, Providence in Early Modern England, 278.
24 Gumble, The Life of General Monck, Duke of Albemarle, 11.
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Edward Hyde, earl of Clarendon, recognized the need to analyze
the secondary causes of the English civil wars, he continued to
believe that the primary cause of those internecine conflicts was
Divine Providence and the purpose was to punish the sins of the
people.25 Reading Tacitus gradually led to greater awareness of the
distinction between Divine Providence and secondary causation in
human history. This more rational and humanistic approach to the
unfolding of events came to be called ‘politic history.’26 Tacitean
or ‘politic’ history acquired a bad name at the early-Stuart court,
because its practitioners included those who moved in the circle of
Robert Devereux, second earl of Essex.27
Politic history
While Tacitus had been read in university circles for some
time, it was only after the earl of Essex took up Tacitus that the
Roman historian came to be read more widely. ‘Politic history,’
based upon the more widespread acquaintance with classical Greek
and Roman historians, was thought to teach men “political wisdom.”
Essex and his circle were drawn to Tacitus because of the light that
his writings cast upon the civil and international wars of mainland
Europe, as well as the tactics and military discipline of the Romans.
Because Tacitus was the most important historian of imperial
Rome, his analytical style was considered relevant to political life
in monarchies and to survival in the same. Tacitus also provided an
25 MacGillivray, Restoration Historians and the English Civil War, 235; Anselment,
“Clarendon and the Caroline Myth of Peace,”52-3.
26 One of the noteworthy features of Tacitus’s historical writing was his determination to
uncover and analyze causes and motives. This sometimes led humanist scholars to criticize
his writings, because they thought that the historian’s job was to narrate rather than to offer
interpretations. Montaigne and Lipsius were drawn to Tacitus because of his interest in the
ethical dimension of political behavior. The decline of republics and the growth in power of
monarchies in early modern Europe caused a renewed interest in the history of Rome under
the emperors as described by Tacitus. Some of the seventeenth-century admirers of Tacitus
wished to make use of his writings to construct an analytical system of political science in
an age when the supporters of absolutism regarded politics and government as the king’s
private business. Moreover, it was widely assumed that if you scratched a Tacitean, you
would find a republican underneath (Burke, “Tacitism,” 154, 161-4). Tacitism also provided an alternative system of political and historical analysis to Machiavelli; it possessed
a moral dimension that was lacking in the Florentine and its use also prevented, to some
extent, being labeled a Machiavellian (Wootton, Paolo Sarpi, 69).
27 Bradford, “Stuart Absolutism and the Utility of Tacitus,” 132.
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intellectual foundation for the revival and strengthening of a martial
ethos. More ominously, it also facilitated criticism of royal policies,
and it undermined both political and ecclesiastical hierarchies.
While accepting that Divine Providence was the primary cause of
what happened in the world, the writers of the English Renaissance
who wrote in the style of ‘politic history’ placed increased emphasis
on secondary causation. Those who left Divine Providence out of
historical accounts were accused of atheism.28
As a result of the English experience of war in the late
sixteenth century, the exhortation to martial fervor by divines
and the reception of Machiavellian political thought concerning
the centrality of war, it became a commonplace of seventeenthcentury thinkers that war was inevitable and the martial arts must
be cultivated. Geffrey Gates argued as early as 1579 that justice
and civil polity cannot be firmly established without military power,
and martial prowess should be valued and encouraged; otherwise,
the sinful descendants of Adam will always work against the
establishment of justice and order. John Sadler, the translator of
Vegetius, reminded his readers that the blessings of peace never last
long except by divine intervention; peace was something that must
constantly be fought for, so it was prudent to equip one’s self with
knowledge of military policy for the next war by reading Greek and
Roman military writers and historians.29 Sir Walter Ralegh insisted
on the primacy of military policy in the deliberations of princes;
military force by itself was useless “unless the same be governed by
counsel and martial wisdom.”30 Gervase Markham said
the soldier is the right arm of justice and carries the sword; wisdom is the
left arm and bears balance. Without a soldier, no estate, no commonwealth
can flourish. Who shall unmask false pretenses but the soldier? Who shall
28 Levy, Tudor Historical Thought, 237-9, 250-1; Kewes, “Henry Saville’s Tacitus,” 51551. Essex opposed the proponents of peace with Spain, such as Sir Robert Cecil, who
pleaded the poverty of the kingdom while he and his circle lavished enormous amounts
of money on their sumptuous houses and luxurious manner of living (Gajda, The Earl of
Essex and Late Elizabethan Political Culture, 105). See also Gajda, “Debating War and
Peace in Late Elizabethan England,” 851-78.
29 Gates, The Defence of Militarie Profession, 11 (dedication is to Edward de Vere, 17th
earl of Oxford); The Foure Bookes of Flavius Vegetius Renatus... of Martiall Policye, trans.
Sadler, unpaginated preface and dedication (dedication is to Francis Russell, 4th earl of
Bedford); de Gaya, Gaya’s Traité des Armes, 1678, ed. Ffoulkes, 5-6. Cf. also Rogers, A
Sermon preached … at the Funerall of William Proude, sig. Dr & v.
30 The Cabinet-Council, in The Works of Sir Walter Ralegh, comp. Birch, i.78.
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confound the secret, subtle traitor but the soldier? Who shall tread down the
public-daring rebel but the soldier? And, indeed, who shall or can do right to
all men but the soldier?31

Writing at the end of the French Religious Wars, Jean
Bodin was less sanguine. Because soldiers love nothing so much
as spoil and pillage, military discipline and the maintenance of
defenses remain important because political communities which
do not protect themselves become “bait” for soldiers, robbers and
thieves. Sir Roger Williams, who had served in the Spanish Army
of Flanders, thought that the Spanish state must be perpetually at
war with Protestant powers because they were urged on by priests
and professional soldiers. The tendency of Spain to make perpetual
war produced expert soldiers.32
The concern to make war central to politics continued even
after the two decades of civil war and upheaval which characterized
the Interregnum. Thomas Venn, the author of a widely used military
manual published in 1672, said that the Roman historians furnished
numerous examples of the lesson that states cannot live long in
peace without the exercise of arms.33 Fulke Greville’s purpose
in writing the Life of Sir Philip Sidney, which was published by
the Commonwealth government in 1652, was to demonstrate that
greatness of heart was better shaped by war than peace.34 Sir Philip
Sidney had believed that history demonstrated a pattern of war
alternating with periods of peace, an idea that he may have derived
from reading Polybius. Indeed, he believed that it was desirable to
have periods of war now and then to prevent Englishmen from being
corrupted by peace. The belief that war and peace alternated with
the same regularity as changes in the seasons continued down to
the eve of the civil wars among military writers.35 Algernon Sidney,
31 Markham, Honour in his Perfection, 1; Steggle, “Essexianism and the Work of Gervase
Markham,” 48.
32 Bodin, The Six Bookes of a Commonweale, ed. MacRae, 596 (sic; actually 598-9); Williams, A Briefe Discourse of Warre, 10.
33 Venn, Military and Maritime Discipline, sig. C2r. Cf. also Carter, Honor Redivivus, or
An Analysis of Honor and Armory, 13-14, and Gailhard, The Compleat Gentleman, ii.139.
34 Greville, Life of Sir Philip Sidney, ed. Smith, 132-3.
35 Jorgensen, “Theoretical Views of War in Elizabethan England,” 477; Ward, Animadversions of Warre, 1; Davies, Military Directions, or the Art of Trayning, sig. A2v.
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who did his best to keep the civil unrest going in England, penned
the maxim that “civil tumults and wars are not the greatest evils that
befall nations,” which he amplified by explaining that
Tis ill that men should kill one another in seditions, tumults and wars; but
’tis worse to bring nations to such misery, weakness and baseness as to have
neither strength nor courage to contend for anything; to have nothing left
worth defending, and to give the name of peace to desolation.36

Before the British and Irish civil wars, writers such as
Barnaby Rich had a genuine horror of internecine strife. Rich had
thought that the highest perfection of nobility was to be found in
“deeds of chivalry... enlightened by martial skill,” and that these
deeds consisted of repressing those who “compound the miseries
of civil war” as well as defending the realm against “foreign
invaders.” Ben Jonson, who validated his martial credentials in the
Low-Countries wars, thought that his duty as a playwright consisted
of persuading his audience “to imitate virtue and renounce vice.”
This required recreating the past in his tragedies with accurate
examples drawn from Roman historians with whom his audience
were already familiar. Two of his most successful plays dealt with
the horror of ambitious men whose attempts to usurp constituted
authority threatened civil war: Sejanus his Fall and Catiline his
Conspiracy.37
Metaphors for war permeated Elizabethan dramatic culture.
The tournament furnishes one example of the battlefield being
viewed as a “high stage.” The London playhouses encouraged
support for foreign wars. In the theaters, plays about Julius Caesar
and Alexander the Great recommended those generals for imitation.
Thomas Heywood argued that the stage furnished notable examples
of courage that could inspire the soldier and rebuke those effeminate
gentlemen who neglected the exercise of arms. Just as the poets
of classical antiquity had thought that war was introduced with the
36 Sidney, Discourses concerning Government, 206.
37 Rich, Fruites of Long Experience, 13; Worden, “Ben Jonson among the Historians,”
68.

Quidditas 41 (2020)

145

discovery of iron mined in the bowels of the earth, so also Elizabethan
and Jacobean poets and dramatists thought of the Low Countries as
a trope for war, because the Eighty Years War seemed interminable,
and because it killed and maimed so many soldiers from the British
Isles. The many maimed veterans who limped through the streets of
London– a gait associated with the devil– were a constant reminder
of the hellishness of war.38
London theaters were both places to dramatize the need for
men to volunteer to serve in England’s military forces abroad, and
on at least one occasion places where recruiting took place. Indeed,
anywhere that crowds gathered– playhouses, bawdy houses and
parish churches– became venues where press-gangs sometimes swept
men up by force for service in the foreign wars. The Elizabethan
Privy Council had thought that impressment for overseas wars was
a useful means of removing vagrants, masterless men and petty
criminals.39 The governments of Western Europe generally thought
that their realms were overpopulated and endeavored to remove
such persons to their colonies.
Soldiers in seventeenth-century England, like the continental
martialists who had influenced them, came to view war as linked to
a broader concept of politics in the Machiavellian mode. As well
as reading ancient military writers such as Vegetius and Caesar, or
Euclid on geometry, they also came to appreciate Roman historians
such as Tacitus. Martialists also understood that they needed to
develop their rhetorical skills so that they could exhort their soldiers
with speeches on the eve of battle and also to persuade their king
and countrymen of the necessity of military preparedness and the
38 de Somogyi, Shakespeare’s Theatre of War, 30-1, 99-101.
39 Ibid., 108-9; Acts of the Privy Council, ed. Dasent, xxvii.290. Neil Younger regards
impressing men for overseas service in the public places of London as atypical, because
most recruiting took place in the counties (War and Politics in the Elizabethan Counties,
170, 172 et passim). However, Ian Archer has demonstrated that the levies of recruits in
London were heavy and frequent. In April 1602 the Privy Council ordered the impressment of 2,000 men to be sent to Ostend; this “Press proved very controversial because of
raids on theaters [and the] press of gentlemen” (“Gazetteer of Military Levies from the City
of London, 1509-1603,” comp. Archer, 045-118, esp. 115).
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virtues engendered by the exercise of arms. Hobbes, however, saw
it differently; he believed that reading Greek and Roman historians
instilled notions of rebellion and tyrannicide in the minds of a people
who lacked judgment and experience.40
Prior to the Great War of 1914-18, there existed in many
societies a “cultural disposition to war,” according to Sir Michael
Howard. At times, and certainly during the seventeenth century, war
was regarded, not as a pathological condition, but as a normal part of
the human condition. Professor Howard thought that such societies
were best described as “bellicist” rather than “militarist.” Liberalminded historians have trouble grasping the idea that anyone would
want to go to war; it takes a Hobbesian cast of mind to imagine such
a thing.41 War was certainly part of the heroic image of European
monarchies and, of course, continued to justify the privileges of
ruling elites and to play a part in the collective memory of their
subjects. How widely this cultural disposition to war was shared
by the commonalty in the seventeenth century is a more difficult
question to answer. Adam Ferguson, who had been chaplain to the
Black Watch Regiment at the Battle of Fontenoy in 1745 and later
became professor of philosophy at Edinburgh University, argued that
ethnic and provincial prejudices always existed among the common
people, whether they were latent or active. These prejudices are
irrational and cannot be readily explained, but political leaders can
easily fan such prejudices into flames and manipulate common
folk to fight their wars. However, such prejudices are not easy to
control or stop. Ferguson also listed another culturally conditioned
response to war: the experience of war can also bring out qualities
of generosity and self-sacrifice, and even ordinary men love to test
their courage and bodily strength. “His sports are frequently an
image of war.” and he loves competition.42
40 Dewald, Aristocratic Experience and the Origins of Modern Culture, 57-8; Hobbes,
Leviathan, ed. Pogson Smith, II.29 (p. 25).

41 Howard, Weapons and Peace, 6-7; Black (ed.), Origins of War in Early Modern Europe, 1, 4, 10-11.
42 Ferguson, An Essay on the History of Civil Society, ed. Forbes, 23-4. A classic example
of how the Elizabethan regime and the military governors and planters in Ireland exploited
ethnic and religious prejudices to justify the expropriation of previously loyal Old English
lords and Old Irish clan chieftains is brilliantly discussed by Bruce Lenman (England’s
Colonial Wars, 1550-1688, chs. 2-5).

Quidditas 41 (2020)

war:”

147

For Ralegh, “the ordinary theme and argument of history is

Since in human reason there hath no means been found of holding all
mankind at peace with itself, it is needful that against the wit and subtlety
of man we oppose not only the brute force of our bodies... but, helping our
strength with art and wisdom, strive to excel our enemies in those points
wherein man is excellent over other creatures.43

Ruthless and arrogant as he was, Ralegh still retained sufficient
intellectual detachment to probe the motivation of himself and his
class:
In these arbitrary wars, there is commonly to be found some small measure
of necessity, though it be seldom observed, perhaps, because it extendeth not
so far as to become public; for where many younger sons of younger brothers
have neither lands nor means to uphold themselves, and where many men
of trade or useful profession know not how to bestow themselves for lack of
employ, there it cannot be avoided but the whole body of state (howsoever
healthfully disposed) should not suffer anguish by grievance of these illaffected members.44

Since war was inevitable, Ralegh believed that England
might as well profit by it. As a matter of strategy, he urged that
England prosecute the war against Spain on the high seas and in
the New World. In his History of the World, Ralegh argues that
the English were destined for a divinely favored role in building an
empire that would exceed the greatness of the Romans. He insisted
that colonial expansion would solve England’s economic problems,
and a privateering war against Spain could pay for itself. Thus, the
crown’s financial embarrassment was not a good excuse for making
peace with Spain. The execution of Ralegh in 1618 produced
much disgust with courtiers who were thought to have accepted
Spanish bribes. Subsequently, the name of Ralegh, a symbol of
English patriotism, was much invoked against the Jacobean policy
of peace and its continuation under Charles I. Between 1620 and
43 Ralegh, A Discourse of the Original and Fundamental Cause of Natural, Arbitrary,
Necessary and Unnatural War, in Works, ed. Birch, viii.253-4. Compare Locke: “The
noise of war... makes so great a part of the history of mankind. ...” ( Two Treatises of Government, ed. Laslett, 431(ii.175).
44 Ralegh, A Discourse of... War, in Works (1751 ed.), ii.26; Rapple, Martial Power and
Elizabethan Political Culture, 60-1 .
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1631, at least four pamphlets were published incorporating the
words Ralegh’s Ghost. One of them was Sir Walter Rawleigh’s
Ghost (1626), written by Thomas Scott, a Puritan divine forced into
exile in the Netherlands, who wrote many anti-Spanish pamphlets
protesting the proposed Spanish marriage, the failure to intervene
effectively on behalf of the Elector Palatine and to honor the alliance
with the Dutch Republic as well as the neglect of the opportunities
for expansion in the New World.45
Like Ralegh, most writers of this period saw an “affinity”
between the “necessity of war” and the “necessity of law.” The
Puritan divine William Gouge provided a classic statement of the
argument that “war is a kind of execution of public justice and a
means of maintaining right:”
For oft there is a conspiracy of many men together in doing wrong, and
so obstinate and violent they are therein as by no admonitions, persuasions,
threatenings, penalties of law or ordinary means of executing justice will
be restrained. And so insufferably ambitious are some, and so insatiably
covetous as no dignities or jurisdictions will content them, no revenues or
profits will satisfy them. Were not such men restrained and suppressed by
force of arms, none should live in quiet; nor should possess or enjoy anything
besides themselves. So as the iniquity of men causeth a necessity of war; and
the benefit that thence ariseth causes pious and righteous men to use it.46

Sir Thomas Craig, an early supporter of James VI and I’s
plan for a union of Scotland and England, thought that the Scots
were bound to be perpetually at war either with England or among
themselves. He based this assertion on the argument that a martial
tradition had always been stronger than a sense of community in
Scotland. For this reason, when Scotland was actually at peace, it
was necessary to encourage idle soldiers and surplus population to
seek military service overseas.47
More recently, Sir George Clark has pointed out that
seventeenth-century political economists all treat war as a normal
and persistent part of human existence. War was an institution, a
“regular and settled mode of action;” in other words, Europe was
45 McCrea, Constant Minds, 66-7; Hill, Intellectual Origins of the English Revolution,
154-60, 205-9; Peltonen, Rhetoric, Politics and Popularity in Pre-Revolutionary England,
177-79. John Sadler, the translator of Vegetius, thought that the English could learn from
that Roman military writer how the Romans conquered barbarians and became “the rulers
of the most part of the world.” Foure Bookes of... Vegetius, trans. Sadler, sig. C1v.
46 Gouge, God’s Three Arrowes: Plague, Famine, and Sword, 214.
47 Craig, De Unione Regnorum Britanniae Tractatus, ed. Terry, 470-1.
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a “military civilization,” and every aspect of economic, social and
political life assumed that this would be so.48
Much as he disliked war and suffered personally from its
consequences, the great Dutch jurist Hugo Grotius assumed that war
was not contrary to natural law or Christian teachings, and must be
accepted as part of the natural condition of mankind. When Grotius
published his De Jure Belli ac Pacis in 1625, war was so pervasive
that it made no sense to seek a pacifist solution in the Erasmian
tradition. Rather, Grotius sought to restrain war by appealing to
natural law and making it serve clear political and judicial ends. He
especially was concerned to distinguish between just and unjust wars
and to seek principles which would limit the ill treatment of prisoners
and prevent the plundering of the property of noncombatants.49
Providence and war
Perpetual war was thought to be the curse of mankind
because God used war to punish wicked men for their sinfulness and
to vindicate the righteous. The theocratic tendencies of Calvinism
revived the Hebraic concept of a God of Battles, and removed some
of the restraints upon warfare. The concept of a Protestant holy war
imposed a positive duty to fight the Catholic forces where there had
been incursions of Protestant communities. By introducing the belief
that the sword was to be used to punish evil-doers, the chivalric belief
in an agonistic struggle was replaced by a determination to utterly
destroy the enemy which is perhaps best exemplified by Cromwell’s
mode of warfare in Ireland. The belief in a holy war against the
Hapsburgs, as the political arm of the Catholic Antichrist, so James
Aho has argued, justified removing spiritual restraints upon warfare
and substituting natural imperatives. As Hobbes remarked, in a
natural state of war there were no “notions of right and wrong” or
“justice and injustice.” “Force and fraud are in war the two cardinal
48 Clark, War and Society in the Seventeenth Century, 9-10. Edmond Silbener, who systematically examined the writings of early modern English political economists, found
that they positively advocated war as a means of acquiring trade (La guerre dans la pensée
économique du XVIe au XVIIIe siècles, 65).
49 Grotius, The Law of War and Peace, trans. Kelsey, II.i.4,5, II.ii.1-2, II.iii.1-2 (pp. 52-5,
63); Scott, “Law of War,” 567; Parrott, “The Causes of the Franco-Spanish War of 163559,” in Black (ed.), Origins of War in Early-Modern Europe, 74.
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virtues.” Although martialists and professional soldiers in the
wars of mainland Europe did not accept this concept of a holy war
without any constraint, this more unrestrained type of warfare did
characterize England’s colonial wars in the Celtic borderlands and
her North American colonies. Indeed, the English came to believe
that war was a means of imposing civility on barbaric peoples 50 .
Medieval treatises justifying war usually start with the
Old Testament which vividly depicts a Hebrew God of Battles
who instructed Joshua in battle tactics. Medieval theologians and
philosophers in the West all seem to have agreed “that war was
part of the general struggle against evil.” They also accepted the
premise that a just war was also grounded in natural law and the
law of nations which was based upon reason and common to all
Christendom.51 This would have seemed logical to Puritan preachers
who stressed that the sinner could only hope for redemption through
the experience of constant warfare in his soul between Christ and
Satan, and that, as a consequence of being a soldier under the
banner of Christ in perpetual conflict, he must endure something
like the horrors of warfare in his spiritual journey to the next
world.52 Alexander Leighton, a Scots Calvinist physician and divine,
appealed to Charles, prince of Wales to lead a holy war against the
Hapsburgs in his Speculum Belli Sacri (1624). For Leighton, “war
is the fruit of sin.” A just war was lawful, sanctioned by natural
law and not repugnant to the law of God. A war, such as the one
fought to help Frederick V, king of Bohemia and Elector Palatine,
regain his territories in the Palatinate, was a just conflict, and just
wars must be fought in an offensive manner; a defensive stance
was not sufficient in the eyes of God.53 Lodowick Lloyd, a poet
50 Aho, Religious Mythology and the Art of War, 194, 197-201; Gouge, The Dignitie
of Chivalrie, title page & p. 2; Housley, Religious Warfare in Europe, 1400-1536, 199;
Johnson, Ideology, Reason and the Limitation of War, 123; Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. Pogson
Smith, I.13 (p. 98); Thomas, In Pursuit of Civility, 163-8.
51 Keen, The Laws of War in the Late Middle Ages, 1965), 8-14.
52 Haller, The Rise of Puritanism, 34, 142.
53 [Leighton,] Speculum Belli Sacri, 1, 6, 9, 12, 17-18, 20, 23, 50-1; cf. also Sutcliffe, The
Practice, Proceedings and Lawes of Armes, 1-2.Sir Francis Bacon rejected the recovery of
the Palatinate as a sufficient cause for a just war, nor did he think that difference of religion
was a justification for war. However, he did believe that fear that the Spanish might invade
or otherwise subvert the English monarchy justified declaring war (Considerations touching a Warre with Spaine and An Advertisement touching an Holy Warre, comp. Rawley, 1,
3, 5, 15-30, 32-63).
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who held the post of sergeant-at-arms at the courts of Elizabeth and
James I, asserted that “the whole Bible is a book of the battles of the
Lord and the whole life of man a military marching to these battles
between the seed of the woman and the serpent.” He assumed that
most of what a general needed to know about military principles and
practice could be learned from the Bible and classical literature.54
Thomas Palmer, a militia chaplain, told his audience in the Bristol
Military Garden that God was “a man of war... who hath proclaimed
it... to be a divine scourge for sin in the hand of the warrior.” In war,
kings are but lieutenants of God, who is the commanding general.55
However, kings could forfeit that divine warrant. The Parliamentary
army justified making war on the king because they believed that his
divine mandate to rule had been destroyed by his refusal to make
peace. He thereby became tainted by “blood guilt”, a concept that
dated back to Anglo-Saxon times. According to the Geneva Bible,
the shedding of innocent blood required expiation.56
There was general agreement among divines and soldiers that war
was inevitable because it manifested the hand of God, but there
was disagreement concerning the exact role of Divine Providence.
One anonymous late-Elizabethan military writer said that biblical
justification for making war must always be sought, and wars
should be undertaken only after consultation to secure “advice and
judgment”–presumably from a council of war composed of the
nobility and high-ranking military officers.57
Anthony Wingfield thought that the outcome of any war must
always be uncertain because God always uses one side to punish the
other.58 In a variation on the same theme, the first marquis of Argyll
54 Lloyd, Stratagems of Jerusalem, sig. A4, p. 1.
55 Palmer, Bristoll’s Military Garden, 4, 7.Thomas Gumble, General George Monck’s
chaplain, believed that the inevitability of war derived from original sin and that it was
part of the divine scheme of justice for sovereigns to wield the sword (The Life of General
Monck, Duke of Albemarle, fo. 7).
56 Crawford, “Charles Stuart, That Man of Blood,” 41-61.
57 A Myrrour for English Souldiers, sig. B1v.
58 Wernham (ed.), The Expedition of Sir John Norris and Sir Francis Drake to Spain and
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said that “war proceeds from the ambition and malice of men, but the
success of it depends on the good will of God.” Like an experienced
warlord, Argyll also believed that military commanders should
be prepared to seize opportunities.59 Fulke Greville believed that
war allowed a soldier to “play an integral part in the divine plan;”
more to the point, it also allowed him to display virtue, enhance his
reputation and maintain order in society.60 A just war must aim at
securing peace, the advancement of the Gospels and the glory of
God, thought Thomas Sutton, but it could also involve the element
of revenge and the maintenance of honor. Since the “Romish
Church” will always be an enemy, a war against papists will always
be just.61 Furthermore, if a war has been declared good and lawful,
then God commands the minister to encourage the soldier.62 The
second earl of Rochester, a deist who had trouble grasping the
concept of Divine Providence, confessed to Bishop Burnet on his
deathbed that he could see nothing wrong in God appointing others
to take “away people with the sword,” for it “is a much gentler way
of dying.”63 The hand of Providence cannot always be discerned
in battle, warned William Gouge, because “war is wavering” and
God sometimes uses war to punish mankind’s sins and to call people
to examine their consciences or “to show that victory cometh not
merely from man’s preparation.”64 But Geffrey Gates thought that
God revealed his hand even before he unsheathed his terrible sword:
God punished a wicked nation by causing it to be unprepared for
war; at the same time he could advance a people by endowing them
Portugal, 1589, 249-50.
59 Campbell, first marquis of Argyll, Instructions to a Son, 155-6.
60 Maclean, “Fulke Greville on War,” 109.
61 Sutton, The Good Fight of Faith, 417-18, 427; Everard, The Arriereban, 16-17.
62 Gosson, The Trumpet of Warre, 1598, sig. B3v.
63 Burnet, Some Passages from the Life and Death of... John, Earl of Rochester, rpr. in de
Sola Pinto (ed.), English Biography of the Seventeenth Century, 126-7.
64 Gouge, God’s Three Arrowes, 268-70.
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with martial virtues.65 Although war is lawful, cautioned John Sym,
it is such a violent course of action that the decision to participate
belongs to Divine Providence. In a warning to soldiers of fortune,
Sym stated that a just war can never exist against the church, the
gospel or true religion. If one perished in an unjust conflict, he
would be guilty of indirect self-murder.66 Richard Brathwait, a poet
who later fought on the royalist side during the English civil wars,
writing in about 1630, could not imagine a holy war being fought
against any enemy except the Turk.67
Justifying war
In an age of religious conflict, both Catholic and Protestant
thinkers were strongly tempted to think of armed conflicts between
the Hapsburgs and the Protestant states as crusades, and to justify
them as holy wars. But, at the same time, other, more sober thinkers
sought to work out a secular and rational foundation for discussing
the concept of just wars which avoided an emphasis upon religious
differences.68 Even Calybute Downing, when he told the Honourable
Artillery Company of London in September 1640 that the right to
avenge is God-given, warned his audience that the grounds for a
just war must be first ascertained. Richard Bernard stated that a
ruler should not go to war lightly, but must first weigh the justness
of the cause against the evils that war always brings. But a just
war was always to be preferred to an unjust peace.69 Looking
back from the eighteenth century, the Dutch-born skeptic Bernard
de Mandeville thought that preachers and chaplains who urged
Christian forgiveness of one’s enemies and then sought to justify
particular wars or rebellions or urged destruction upon others for
65 Gates, Defence of Militarie Profession, 20-1. See also Hampton, A Proclamation of
Warre from the Lord of Hosts, 2-3.
66 Life’s Preservative against Self-Killing, ed. MacDonald, 119.
67 Brathwait, The English Gentleman, 145-6.
68 Johnson, Just War Tradition and the Restraint of War, pp. xxv-xxvi, 95.
69 Downing, A Sermon Preached to the Renowned Company of Artillery, 4-5; Bernard,
The Bible-Battells, 51-3; Leighton, Speculum Belli Sacri, 5.
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their religious beliefs were hypocritical.70
The divines were in general agreement that a just war might
be declared to defend one’s country, religion, liberty and goods, to
help friends and allies who were oppressed, to suppress rebellion
and to enforce the laws, to obtain a crown justly claimed, to repress
pirates and to punish breaches of covenants. An army also had
the right to march through neutral territory in prosecution of a just
war.71 Thomas Proctor was probably referring to the Irish when
he declared that wars might be undertaken to spread good laws, to
promote civility and to keep men from living in disorder without
good government. Thomas Fuller may have been thinking of others
besides the Turk when he argued that force might be used to begin the
process of conversion which could then be followed by more gentle
methods of persuasion.72 Fuller also believed that preventative war
or a pre-emptive strike was justified where there was a “just fear of
invasion” by the perceived enemy, while Richard Bernard argued
in a similar vein that another just reason for war was to establish
dominion in territory close to one’s borders.73
In order to sustain the concept of just war, divines and
military writers attempted to banish motives of private vengeance
from warfare. Princes and magistrates must wage war as servants
of God without any private motive of revenge. For an individual
soldier to seek revenge was seditious, because God had given
the sword of justice to the prince or magistrate. None were to be
regarded as enemies except those so declared by public authority.
Moreover, fighting a just war never excuses killing the innocent or
those who have surrendered and been disarmed. Putting prisoners
70 de Mandeville, An Inquiry into the Origin of Honour and the Usefulness of Christianity
in War 168-9.
71 Downing, Sermon Preached to the Renowned Company of Artillery, 11-17; Bernard,
Bible-Battells, 38-9, 41, 43-5; Sutcliffe, Practice, Proceedings and Lawes of Armes, 1-3,
6-8.
72 P[rocter,] Of the Knowledge and Conducte of Warres, fos. 44-5; Fuller, The Historie of
the Holy Warre, 13.
73 bid.; Bernard, Bible-Battells, 46.
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to the sword was not permitted unless there was a threat to one’s
safety. Even during the English civil wars, when a royalist chaplain
told the troopers of the Prince of Wales’s Life Guard that they were
messengers of God sent to punish rebels, who were by definition
“evil men,” he cautioned the soldiers never to visit divine retribution
upon the innocent. They were to distinguish between the leaders
of rebellion and those who were duped and drawn into rebellion.
François de la Noue, a veteran of the French Religious Wars and
the Low-Countries wars, did not condemn service in lawful wars
fought by one’s prince, but he could not bring himself to believe
that the former were proper wars; rather, he called them “butcherly
slaughters.”74
The thrust of the many sermons and military treatises which
urged support of the war efforts of British monarchs and other
Protestant princes was to rally the political nation, both clerical and
lay, and to get them to open their purses for taxes and voluntary
contributions and to elicit the support of volunteers. Clearly, some
of these writings go beyond official military and foreign policy with
a view to urging more active participation in the mainland European
wars on the Protestant side. There is much evidence that the efforts
of the clergy and the military writers to achieve their goals were
successful. Indeed, official efforts to license sermons and printed
books and, thus, to contain and direct these debates were increasingly
less successful as more and more of the Protestant subjects of the
early Stuart monarchs became dissatisfied with government foreign
and military policy and convinced of the necessity of intervention in
the continental religious wars.75
The writings and sermons of the late-sixteenth and earlyseventeenth centuries concerning what constituted a just war became
74 [de Loque,] Discourses of Warre and Single Combat, trans. Eliot, 3-4; Bernard, BibleBattells, 51,53,60-1; Pears (trans. & ed.), The Correspondence of Sir Philip Sidney and
Hubert Languet, 154; Boteler, War Practically Performed, 191-2; Palmer, Bristoll’s Military Garden, 10, 17; Symmons, A Military Sermon, sig. A2; de la Noue, The Politicke and
Militarie Discourses of the Lord De La Nowe, 116, 125.
75 Hale, “Incitement to Violence?”, 371; Cogswell, “Underground Verse and the Transformation of Early Stuart Political Culture,”, 278; id., The Blessed Revolution: English
Politics and the Coming of War, 63.
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more focused on particular causes and events, such as the plight of
the king and queen of Bohemia who had been driven out of their
lands by the Hapsburgs at the beginning of the Thirty Years War.
At the same time, sermons and writings on the justification of war
which were specifically aimed at military audiences became more
politically charged in the years leading up to the Wars of the Three
Kingdoms. In a book published in 1598, Robert Barret, answering
the question whether it was wrong for Christians to fight Christians,
asserted that the soldier is bound to serve his prince and it is not
for him to question whether the cause “be just or unjust.” Then,
as an afterthought, he added that “in such a case, I wish men to be
well advised.” In 1631, William Gouge wrote that soldiers should
take comfort and be encouraged by the knowledge that they were
fighting a just war. To die in such a war was a kind of martyrdom. In
September 1640, Calybute Downing told the Honourable Artillery
Company of London that the enemy was the “Jesuited” faction at
court.76
In an attempt to prepare his congregation for the coming
of civil war in 1642, Richard Ward, a Puritan minister at Stanstead
Mountfitchet, Essex, provided a justification for taking up arms which
drew upon the writings of classical authors such as Plutarch, Seneca
and St. Augustine. Everything must be done to avoid civil war, and
such a conflict must never be undertaken lightly, but once begun
it was necessary to achieve victory, because civil wars were “not
easily quenched,” and fell particularly hard upon noncombatants.
St. Augustine was cited to the effect that wars were sometimes
undertaken “out of a true and sincere desire of settling peace.” Ward
also drew upon Seneca to place the blame for conflict upon the new
concept of possessive individualism, or the unqualified rights of
private property: “Take from the world these pronouns, mine and
thine/ The wars will cease, and peace through the world will shine.”
From Plutarch, a priest of the cult of Apollo, Ward quoted the belief
that “there is no war whereof some sin or vice is not the cause,
viz., either pleasure, covetousness, ambition, desire to rule, or the
76 Leighton, Speculi Belli Sacri, dedication; Barret, The Theoricke and Practicke of Moderne Warres, 1598), 11; Gouge, God’s Three Arrowes, 217; Downing, Sermon Preached to
the Renowned Company of Artillery, 22-3.
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like.” Those who desired to live in peace with others should “wage
continual war” with themselves and their sins, because “wickedness
within” was the cause of “war without.” Ward doubted that war
could ever be eliminated, and he reminded his audience that one of
the useful functions of war was to act as “a whetstone of fortitude,”
which encouraged youth to embrace martial discipline.77
Seasoned politicians– especially from among the ranks of
the gownsmen– were less persuaded by clerical and martial rhetoric
concerning just wars. Lord Burghley thought that there was no such
thing as a just war, although a good cause could confer legitimacy
upon a conflict.78 Bacon derived his rules of war from the agonistic
struggles of the Greeks– in particular the mythological tale of
Perseus. There must be “a just and honourable cause of war,” which
ordinary soldiers can support, for example, the overthrow of tyranny;
such a war should have the prospect of being completed within a
short period of time; and one should avoid conquering neighboring
nations.79 The first earl of Clarendon remained convinced that there
were strong moral and religious grounds for opposing war, but he
accepted that the law allows war as a means of seeking justice when
other resources have failed and as a means of deterring evil-doers.
To fail to do justice was a greater evil than war. But Clarendon
reminded his readers that the vindictiveness which was engendered
by war lives on long after the war has ended and poisons behavior
and discourse.
In war, the confidence and the courage which a victorious army contracts
by notable successes, and the dejection of spirit and the consternation which
a subdued party undergoes by frequent defeats is not at an end when the
war is determined, but hath its effects very long after; and the tenderness of
nature and the integrity of manners, which are driven away or powerfully
discountenanced by the corruption of war, are not quickly recovered, but
instead thereof a roughness, a jealousy and distrust introduced that makes
77 Ward, The Anatomy of Warre, 2-4, 9-10, 14, 16.
78 Cecil, Lord Burghley, Certain Preceptes or Directions for the Well Ordering and Carriage of a Man’s Life, 10-11.
79 Bacon, De Sapienta Veterum, in Works, vi.715-16. Compare also Bacon’s An Advertisement touching an Holy Warre in Certain Miscellany Works, 117.
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conversation unpleasant and uneasy, and the weeds which grow up in the
shortest war can hardly be pulled up and extirpated without a long and
unsuspected peace.80

War and the state of nature
Clarendon added that pacifists are closer to natural law and
revealed religion than those who think that God prohibited only
single murders but allowed war. Looking back upon the destructive
religious wars of the seventeenth century, John Locke reasoned that
public officials in a commonwealth did not possess the authority to
wage war for religious motives such as the obliteration of heresy and
idolatry, because they never possessed the natural right to change
the religious views of others or to punish them for such views nor to
impose their own religious beliefs. Locke further stated that most
religious wars in the past had served as a cover for ambition, greed
and lust for plunder and rapine.81
The early modern preoccupation with war in the political
thought of mainland Europe, reflected in the writings of Machiavelli,
Grotius and others, became especially evident in the British Isles
after 1640 in the political thought of Hobbes, John Locke and
Algernon Sidney. All agreed with Grotius that political communities
existed in a ‘state of nature’ where there was no agreed-upon body
of positive law, arbiter or superior authority which all parties in the
international sphere would accept, and hence for Hobbes they lived
in a condition of perpetual war. Although it used to be understood
that to John Locke this state of nature meant a state of peace, Richard
Cox argues that Locke’s views were much closer to those of Hobbes
than Locke found it safe to admit in the repressive atmosphere of
the Restoration when his Two Treatises of Government was actually
written. Locke was at pains to disguise this similarity of his views
to those of Hobbes because of the odium in which Hobbes came to
be held during the Restoration. Locke also believed that the state
of nature was one characterized by war and anarchy in which there
80 Hyde, “Of War,” in A Collection of Various Tracts, 25-6, 28-9. See also van der Molen,
Alberico Gentili and the Development of International Law, 129.
81 Cox, Locke on War and Peace, 155-6.
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existed no natural law. It was the unjust use of force, or implied
force, which brought about this state of war; such actions put man
into a state of nature where there was no judge but the successful
application of force. Such behavior was against reason, but because
there was no arbiter in a state of nature, the party or person who
resorted unjustly to force forfeited any claim to his life.82
At the beginning of the seventeenth century, midway through
the Eighty Years War, the exigencies of war nearly overwhelmed
political thought; Grotius had labored to restrain the excesses of war
by developing a body of international law which he called “the law
of war.” Grotius added that it was the duty of the Christian soldier
to fight on behalf of justice. Thus, war had a moral purpose when
properly fought. Although Sidney and Locke did not accept the
concept of a corpus of positive law relating to war, they did try to
lend a moral purpose to warfare. Hence it was morally justifiable to
settle disputes by war, or, within a political community, to resort to
rebellion. There was a rawer edge to Sidney: for him war remained at
the heart of political relations and the neglect of military preparedness
would lead to the dissolution of political communities.83 The temper
of Algernon Sidney, the aristocratic soldier, is revealed by the
motto which he inscribed in the Visitors’ Book of the University of
Copenhagen in 1659: “This hand, always an enemy to tyrants, seeks
by the sword peace under liberty.”84 How much Sidney actually
desired peace remains an open question. He argued that war was
necessary because human society was not intended for peace, and
civil society would dissolve without constant military preparedness
and vigilance to defend liberty against tyrants. Also, as a younger
son of a peer, he knew that peace meant unemployment for the
soldier.85
82 Scott, “Law of War,” 565; Cox, Locke on War and Peace, pp. xviii-xix, 21-8, 72,
146; Locke, Two Treatises of Government, ed. Laslett, introduction, 45-8, 320 (ii.17), 321
(ii.19), 436-7 (ii.181-2); Teitler, The Genesis of the Professional Officer’s Corps, 3-5.
83 Scott, “Law of War,” 565-6, 581, 583.
84 Scott, “Law of War,” 583.
85 Scott, “Law of War,” 581-2.
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Employment for swordsmen
The need to find employment for the nobility had long been
used as a justification for war. In 1472, the archbishop of Canterbury,
speaking to Parliament, advocated war with France because it would
promote domestic peace by giving employment overseas to unruly
younger sons of knights and barons.86 Shakespeare has King Henry
IV, who regretted the civil wars of his reign, give the following
advice to the future Henry V to unite the subjects of his realm:
Be it thy course to busy giddy minds
With foreign quarrels; that action, hence borne out,
May waste the memory of former days.87

Thomas Fuller thought that a holy war, like the Crusades, might
be undertaken to provide employment for restless and violent men,
although he was troubled by the prospect that men might go to war
for adventure and companionship rather than religious motives.
Although Marlowe’s plays exploit the theater-goers’ appetite for
dramas about heroic soldiers. Alan Shepard insists that they also
warn audiences about the dangers of militarism– exemplified by the
delight in war sometimes displayed by military leaders.88 In The
Maid of Honour, Massinger argued that the nobility were intended
to be warriors with a special mission to seize and plunder that which
England lacked:
Nature did
Design us to be warriors, and to break through
Our ring the sea, by which we are environed;
And we by force must fetch in what is wanting,
Or precious to us.

Younger sons and brothers would get into mischief, if the monarch
did not provide them with honorable employment.
86 Ferguson, The Chivalric Tradition in Renaissance England, 39.
87 Henry IV, Part II, IV.iv. Compare Monck, Observations upon Military and Political
Affairs, 4-5.
88 Fuller, Historie of the Holy Warre, 14; Shepard, Marlowe’s Soldiers, 3-5, 22-5.
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May you live long, sir,
The king of peace, so you deny not us
The glory of war; let not our nerves
Shrink up with sloth, nor want of employment
Make younger brothers thieves; ‘tis their swords, sir,
Must sow and reap their harvest.89

Plays about war proliferated during the 1590s. Like the
Romans, late Elizabethan playwrights frequently used the theater to
dramatize new concepts of making war. There was also an element
of innovation in the ways in which playwrights presented what
Patricia Cahill calls “narratives of modernity.” As a consequence of
this exposure to Roman historians, British dramatists, essayists and
the military nobility and their gentry adherents also came to believe
that the people, when exposed for long periods of time to peace,
grew discontented and self-indulgent and were given to disorder,
which, in turn, bred civil war. The degree to which the military
aristocracies of the British Isles had enshrined the idea that honor
must be validated on the battlefield in every generation meant that a
state which was long at peace must testify to the effeminacy of kings
and nobles alike.90 Lucan had observed that civil war broke out
in Rome because of extravagance which arose from riches which
were derived from the spoils of war. Thereafter prosperity and
extravagance effeminated its citizens:
Among the people there were hidden causes of war– the causes which have
brought down ruin on Imperial races. For when Rome had conquered the
world and Fortune showered excess wealth upon her, virtue was dethroned by
prosperity, and spoil taken from the enemy lured men to extravagance: they
set no limit to their wealth or their dwellings; greed rejected the food that
once sufficed: men seized for their use garments scarce decent for women to
wear.91

Late-Elizabethan writers believed that long periods of peace
effeminated people and invited attack by foreign powers. A just war
89 The Maid of Honour (1632), lines 202-206, 215-20, in Edwards and Gibson (eds.), The
Plays and Poems of Philip Massinger, i.127-8. The Maid of Honour was written 1621-2.
90 Taunton, 1590s Drama and Militarism, 2-5; Cahill, Unto the Breach, 2-3, 68; Waggoner, “An Elizabethan Attitude toward War and Peace,” 23: Shifflett, Stoicism, Politics
and Literature in the Age of Milton, 11-12; Wells, “‘Manhood and Chivalrie’: Coriolanus,
Prince Henry and the Chivalric Revival,”395-422.
91 Lucanus, The Civil War, Books I-X, transl. Duff , Bk. I p. 15.
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was a natural function of a healthy state; a state long at peace could
fall victim to civil wars and aggression. Bacon essentially agreed,
and stated that the body politic could not remain in good health
without military exercises. Otherwise effeminacy would corrupt
men’s courage and manners.92 A good ruler understood that his
duty was to govern his subjects so that they might live in peace,
but, at the same time, insure that they did not neglect the arts of war
during periods of peace so that they would always be ready to defend
themselves. Fulke Greville thought that the English people were
naturally valiant, but were corrupted by long periods of peace. They
were best kept from mutiny and decay through periodic employment
in foreign wars.93 Thomas Scott insisted that the aristocracy should
display the virtue of courage, pursue an active life and take up the
sword so as to avoid the corrupting influence of the pursuit of peace
and profit. These arguments were intended to show that James VI
and I’s policy of peace could only effeminate the aristocracy.94
Edward Hyde, earl of Clarendon, thought that the 1630s were
viewed by many Englishmen as a period of peace and prosperity. He
explained the coming of civil war in the 1640s by falling back on the
explanation employed by Roman authors such as Lucan and Virgil
which asserted that cycles of war and disaster naturally alternated
with periods of peace and plenty that produced pride and excess if
they persisted too long. Clarendon was attempting to explain the
Caroline myth of peace. This belief in a halcyon moment followed
by civil war, which could not be entirely blamed on Charles I, was
shared by many other contemporaneous writers.95 Historians of the
Restoration period continued to believe that wars were a divine
92 Waggoner, “An Elizabethan Attitude toward War and Peace,” 22-3; Bacon, “Of the
Greatness of Kingdoms and Estates,” in Works, ed. Spedding et al., xii.185.
93 Castiglione, The Book of the Courtier, trans. Bull, 1976), 302-3; Grevill, The Life of the
Renowned Sir Philip Sidney, in Works, ed. Grosart, iv.79-80.
94 Peltonen, Classical Humanism and Republicanism in English Political Thought, 15701640, 248.
95 Hyde, The History of the Rebellion and Civil Wars in England, ed. Macray, i.2; Anselment, “Clarendon and the Caroline Myth of Peace,” 37-9. See also Donagan, “Halcyon
Days and the Literature of War,” 65-100, for a discussion of the news-books’ reports on
the horrors of the Thirty Years War as well as the extensive military literature warning the
English to be militarily prepared.
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punishment visited upon nations and peoples who possessed a surfeit
of peace and plenty. They also assumed that peace and plenty were
self-limiting and wars were cyclical.96
Those who followed the profession of arms for pay were
often called soldiers of fortune, but Sir James Turner thought “most
of them might be called sons of misfortune” because so many
soldiers were reduced to begging when caught between wars or in
old age. Turner admitted that it was morally wrong for a soldier
to serve a state or a prince in a war which he knew to be unjust,
but he pointed out that the issues in most wars, such as the Dutch
war of independence or the civil wars of France, Germany and the
British Isles, were complicated and exercised jurists, divines and
politicians in long debate. The prosecution of such wars could not
have waited until the issues had been resolved to the intellectual
and moral satisfaction of “every dull and block-headed soldier.”
“It was enough for them to believe what their masters had said,
that the cause was just and therefore lawful for them to serve for
wages.”97 Thomas Hobbes charged that the flames of civil war in
the Three Kingdoms were fanned by gentlemen who had “wasted
their fortunes” and were looking for employment as soldiers for
whatever side offered them the most money.98 Sir William Segar
thought that war was necessary to sort out those born to command
from those destined to be subjected. War was necessary to keep
swordsmen from idleness, and the labor and discipline of war made
men temperate and honest.99 Jean Gailhard, a French immigrant and
advocate of martial preparedness in Restoration England, believed
that young gentlemen were corrupted by university life. Rather, they
should be kept from luxury and accustomed to hardship so that the
96 MacGillivray, Restoration Historians and the English Civil War, 19, 238-9. For other
examples, see Anon., Britania Triumphalis, 1-2; Churchill, Divi Britannica, 342; Heylen,
Cyprianus Anglicus, 449; D[avies], The Civil Warres of Great Britain and Ireland, proem,
sig. C.
97 Turner, Pallas Armata, 363-5.
98 Hobbes, Behemoth, ed. Molesworth, pt. I, p.6; Rapple, Martial Power and Elizabethan
Political Culture, 87.
99 Segar, Honor, Military and Civil, I. 4.
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state might remain in a posture of arms, and have a reputation for the
same among neighboring states.100 In France, Louis XIV felt that he
needed the example of bravery which the noblesse d’épée provided,
and he was reluctant to discipline their excesses too harshly.101
Impressment and social control
The military aristocracies of the British Isles could not
march off to war without followers; except where clan loyalties
and kinship ties remained strong, the lesser orders were reluctant
to volunteer and often had to be impressed. Sir Henry Knyvett had
advocated compulsory military service during the late-Elizabethan
wars not only because he feared a Spanish invasion, but also because
he believed that overseas military expeditions employing impressed
soldiers from England could make use of surplus population. The
belief that impressment and martial discipline were effective means
of social control was quite widespread. Jean Bodin thought that no
city was so well governed that it would not be better off by purging
its vagabonds and mutinous multitudes and sending them off to war.
But Thomas Fuller had difficulty reconciling this practice with his
concept of a holy war. He did not care for the idea of recruiting
murderers and thieves for such an army lest “the Devil’s Black
Guard should be God’s soldiers.”102
The Elizabethan Privy Council and most county and borough
magistrates viewed impressment as a legitimate means of removing
beggars and masterless men, whom, they believed, constituted the
bulk of participants in popular tumults, from the scene of their
misdeeds. The belief that impressment was a remedy for excess
population and popular disorder in a commonwealth was also
expressed by Thomas Hobbes.103 One of the examples that Ralegh
100 Gailhard, The Compleat Gentleman, I. 18.
101 Ford, Robe and Sword, 17-18. Compare Bacon, “Of the Greatness of Kingdoms and
Estates,” Essays, in Spedding (ed.), Works, vi.448.
102 Knyvett, The Defence of the Realme, 11-12; Bodin, Sixe Bookes of a Commonweale,
ed. McRae, 602-3; Fuller, Historie of Holy Warre, 14-15, 18.
103 Jorgenson, “Theoretical Views of War in Elizabethan England,” 476-7; Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. Pogson Smith, II.30 (p.267).
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gives of necessary or natural war is when a country is afflicted
with overpopulation to the point where famine and misery threaten
internal stability and cause suffering hordes to migrate to other parts
of the world that are more thinly populated. In practice, Ralegh’s
distinction between necessary and arbitrary war breaks down. For
example, a country such as Spain, which suffered from widespread
poverty, but not necessarily famine, resorted to colonization of
lands in the New World in order to reduce the danger of domestic
rebellion. Ralegh approved of this kind of arbitrary war, following
Machiavelli’s reasoning, and applied it to the English plantation of
Ireland.104
Few governments of the seventeenth century were able to pay
the full costs of warfare. Therefore, soldiers were usually expected to
plunder in order to subsist in the field and to seek recompense. “Just
wars hath these effects: whatsoever we take or win from the enemy,
that is justly ours, and the same by the law of nations is accounted
lawful purchase.” Land that is won belongs to the prince who paid for
the war, while the goods were customarily divided among the soldiers
whose blood paid for the purchase, according to Matthew Sutcliffe.
In order to maintain discipline and morale, Sutcliffe, citing ancient
authorities, thought that the best practice for distributing booty was
to bring it all to one place and allow the general to divide it, having
regard to soldiers of exceptional valour and the wounded who could
not be present to share in the spoil.105 Jurists of the sixteenth century
generally agreed that looting and plunder were justified, and that
practically anything could be done to destroy the enemy’s ability to
wage war, including extorting money, burning houses, destroying
food supplies and ransoming captives. Attitudes changed little in
the seventeenth century, and, although Grotius wished to distinguish
between combatants and noncombatants and to spare the latter and
their property, he did hold that by the law of nations “enemies are
held to be entitled to no consideration.” Grotius reasoned that
since the slaughter of the enemy was permitted, the destruction and
104 Ralegh, A Discourse of the Originall and Fundamentall Cause of Naturall, Customary, Arbtrary, Voluntary and Necessary Warre, sig. D1v; Luciani, “Ralegh’s Discourse of
War and Machiavelli’s Discorsi,” 123-4.
105 Sutcliffe, Practice, Proceedings and Lawes of Armes, 13.
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plunder of his property followed logically.106 Gervase Markham
believed that the proper rewards of the soldier were honor, fame and
wealth. Wealth consisted of “a competent or bountiful maintenance
to support the soldier in his place and make him capable of glorious
undertakings.” However, Markham believed that honor must be the
soldier’s principal reward.107
The influence of martial culture in England also extended
to the mercantile community. English mercantilist thinkers were
bellicose and believed that since war was inevitable, a ruler must
always be ready by encouraging the exercise of arms. They also
assumed that the king would tax and store up the proceeds of foreign
trade so that he would have the financial means to wage war.108
Building upon this premise, Thomas Mun argued that one of the
main reasons to seek opportunities for expanding foreign trade was
to acquire the treasure to possess standing armies and navies and to
be able to wage war on both land and sea. Like many Englishmen
of his time, Thomas Mun had little liking for the Dutch, but he did
greatly admire their industry in accumulating wealth from fishing
and trading, just as English and Scottish martialists discovered that
they had much to learn from Dutch methods of warfare. In response
to the argument that the Dutch fortresses were England’s first line of
defense, Mun replied that English soldiers manned those defenses
while Parliament subsidized the States’ Army, which freed the
Dutch to concentrate their efforts on conquering and plundering the
East Indies. He thought that England had the “right and power” to
make war on the Dutch, conquer their empire and subordinate their
mercantile interests to those of England.109
Mun insisted that an increase in the foreign trade of England
(by taking commerce away from the Dutch) would also confer many
domestic benefits. In preparing for war, which Mun also regarded
106 Redlich, De Praeda Militari, 4-5.
107 Markham, Honour in his Perfection, 3-4.
108 [Hales,] A Discourse of the Common Weal of the Realm of England, ed. Lamond, 84,
90, 94, 113, 115; Silberner, La guerre dans la pensée economique, ch. 2.
109 Mun, England’s Treasure by Forraign Trade, 73-4, 78-9.
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as inevitable, the king would provide employment for many of his
subjects who would be kept busy building warships, constructing
and repairing fortifications, growing and storing grain and other
provisions necessary for waging war. Mun also thought that banks
would be necessary to pay and maintain armies and navies, and, by
providing regular pay, keep them in good discipline. Since the Bank
of Amsterdam (founded 1635) did not yet exist when Mun wrote
these words, he must have been thinking of Italian and south German
banks. Armories and magazines would also be needed for arms,
ordnance, munitions, fodder and provisions. All of these activities
would stimulate employment. As for storehouses and magazines,
Mun was thinking of the famous Venetian Arsenal “admired for
the magnificence of the buildings, the quantity of the munitions
and stores for both sea and land, the multitude of the workmen, the
diversity and excellence of the arts.”110
Justifications of war were also stimulated by particular
events such as the outbreak of the Thirty Years War, the Hapsburg
invasion of the Palatinate and the resumption of the Eighty Years
War. England had always retained a respectable military tradition,
which was strengthened by the rechivalrization of the aristocracy
and the experience of the late-Elizabethan wars. This bellicism was
reinvigorated in the 1620s by the voices of those who called for
intervention in the Palatinate as well as military aid to other Protestant
princes. The Mirrour of Majestie, an emblem book published in
1618, urged Prince Charles to assume a martial stance and to emulate
his late brother Henry, prince of Wales. Prince Charles was also
told that the three black plumes of the traditional crest of the prince
of Wales should remind him of the notable valour of the Black
Prince.111 In 1626, Thomas Barnes published a sermon addressed to
the Puritan war party which favored intervention in the Palatinate
and called upon the nobility and gentry to return to the exercise of
110 Mun, England’s Treasure by Forraign Trade, 69-70.
111 G., H., The Mirrour of Majestie, 6-7; Cust, Charles I and the Aristocracy, 1625-1642,
131-2, 176-7.
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arms.112 Thomas Trussell, a military writer, warned that England
must awaken herself and look to her defense because the times were
no longer “secure.” Life was so altered that the military profession
had replaced the legal profession as the better guarantee of justice
and the laws and of peace and concord.113 The Thirty Years War laid
before Englishmen the issues of religious ideology, national honor
and dynastic interests. Not only did many feel strongly about the
need to support their fellow Protestants in Germany; they were also
mindful of the fact that Elizabeth of Bohemia and her descendants
would be the heirs to the thrones of the Three Kingdoms if the then
unmarried Prince Charles failed to produce heirs. If literary activity
is any measure, English authors took this to heart: between 1620
and 1642 (when the theaters were closed by order), some 55 plays
and masques and at least 60 poems and prose works were published
or written containing references to the German wars.114 In a more
practical vein, the Council of War subsidized the publication of
military manuals in preparation for expeditions to be sent abroad.115
When Charles I and the duke of Buckingham reversed their
pro-Spanish policy and mounted the expedition to Cadiz in 1625,
they were emulating the second earl of Essex’s more glorious raid
of 1596. However, the disastrous expedition to the Isle of Rhé
did nothing to add to the reputation of Charles and Buckingham.
The attempt to relive the myths and glories of late-Elizabethan
martial culture ultimately proved embarrassing. Thereafter, the
Caroline Court undertook to redefine chivalric ideals in a way that
de-emphasized the martial values of old. The jousting tournament
was cast aside and replaced by masques which made a virtue of
the Caroline peace of the 1630s. At Whitehall Palace, the Armada
112 [Barnes,] Vox Belli, sig. A2, p. 40 (Dedication is to Sir Horace Vere, Lord Tilbury).
113 Trussel, The Souldier Pleading his owne Cause, B1v-B2r (Dedication is to Edward,
Lord Conway).
114 Werner, “Hector of Germany,” Smuts (ed.), The Stuart Court and Europe, 113-14.
115 Markham, The Souldier’s Accidence, sig. A2; id., The Souldier’s Grammar was a more
advanced military manual aimed at field-grade officers which discussed formations and
maneuvers for military units larger than companies and troops.
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tapestries hanging in the guard room which depicted the naval
victory of 1588, were taken down and stored. With the outbreak
of the Bishops’ Wars in 1638, Charles I had Sir Anthony van Dyck
paint a portrait of himself mounted on a horse, dressed in armor
and wielding a baton of command together with another portrait of
the eight-year-old Charles, prince of Wales also wearing armor and
flourishing a pistol.116 But these gestures were not sufficient to make
up for the royal neglect of military preparedness after 1603.
Much has been written about the reception of Machiavellian
thought in seventeenth-century England, and it is evident that its
influence on clerics, soldiers and political thinkers as well as the
educated elite in general was considerable even though they did
not quote him directly. War had been the stuff of history– whether
perused in the works of classical authors, medieval chroniclers or
the Old Testament– and Machiavellian discourse restored war to its
central place in politics. The peaceful inclinations of James VI
and I and Charles I were untypical of the behavior of early modern
European princes and have long distracted historians from the
influence of the many swordsmen and professional soldiers from
the Three Kingdoms who fought in the religious wars of continental
Europe or the divines and members of Parliament who advocated
that their monarchs should alter their foreign and military policies
and go to the aid of fellow Protestants.
It is now clear that England had become a bellicist society
in which a cultural disposition to war had developed– if, indeed, it
had ever lost such an inclination. Evidence for the existence of an
irenic culture outside of the courts of James VI and I and Charles I
is weak, but even swordsmen had their doubts about this bellicosity.
Although he had been a companion of Sir Philip Sidney and thus
associated with the Puritan war party, Fulke Greville’s “A Treatie
[i.e., Treatise] of Warres” is ambivalent about war and recognizes
that it was a destroyer of the arts of peace, a subverter of good
116 Adamson, “Chivalry and Political Culture in Caroline England,” 169-74, 182; Manning, “Sir John Burgh, 1582-1627,” 391-95. Schwoerer, Gun Culture in Early Modern
England, 149; For a different view, cf. Cust, Charles I and the Aristocracy, especially
chapts. 2 and 4.
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government and “the perfect type of Hell.”117 Although a leader
among martialists, the second earl of Essex was willing to concede
that peace was a more natural state of affairs than war, and that after
twenty years of war with Spain England needed peace if only to
restore its commerce. However, Essex thought that the prospect
of peace was doubtful because the Spanish could not be trusted.
At the same time, Essex believed that too much peace softened the
sinews of the country– the valor of its men.118 As for Scotland and
Ireland, they had always remained societies organized for war-- if
on a smaller scale and lacking the resources for modern warfare.
At the end of the English civil wars, one of the objectives which
John Milton had in mind when writing Paradise Lost was to cure
his audience of their fascination with and ready acceptance of war.
Milton had assumed that his readers, many of whom had served as
soldiers either at home or abroad, or had studied military history
in the works of classical historians, or had devoured news-books
about the numerous wars of their own age, would be quite familiar
with military terminology and institutions.119 Little wonder that this
would be so, since they were frequently reminded from pulpit and
press that war was inevitable, a punishment for the sins of mankind
and part of the human condition. Even for the secular-minded who
might reject the second argument, human history still afforded much
evidence of the truth of the first and third arguments, and therefore it
was imprudent not to prepare for war.120 Moreover, if one believed
that justice could be maintained only by war and that the defense of
liberty required that the sword remain unsheathed, then there was no
recourse but the perpetual exercise of arms.
During the 1620s, the arguments for going to war to preserve
dynastic interests, to assist beleaguered Protestants and to redeem
the tarnished reputation of the House of Stuart had led to a series of
military and naval expeditions to the Palatinate, Cadiz and the Isle of
117 Greville, “A Treatie of Warres,” in Works, ed. Grosart, ii.13.
118 An Apologie of the Earle of Essex, sigs.A3, F3, quoted in Jorgensen, “Theoretical
Views of War in Elizabethan England,” 470.
119 Freeman, Milton and the Martial Muse, 8.
120 Locke admits that the original state of nature, where everyone is “both judge and
executioner of the law of nature,” was not peaceful, and individuals were quickly driven
into civil societies and commonwealths (Locke, Two Treatises of Government, ed. Laslett,
II.212, 455).
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Rhé.121 However, the English government was no longer organized
for war, it lacked the political will to wage war and it shamefully
mismanaged these expeditions, while Parliament neglected to
provide the necessary funds. Yet, the lesson of the need for military
preparedness was not entirely lost, and considerable money and
effort was invested in preparing the county trained bands for home
defense during the 1630s.122 This effort, with the notable exception
of the trained bands of the City of London, was also unsuccessful.
In the short run, the many arguments put forward to justify the
waging of war as policy appear ineffectual. But, between 1638 and
1642, when the various crises deepened in the Three Kingdoms,
the theological, moral, rational and political arguments justifying a
resort to arms were ready at hand.
Roger B. Manning is emeritus professor of history at Cleveland State University,
and has also taught at The Ohio State University and Case Western Reserve
University. He is the author of Religion and Society in Elizabethan Sussex (1969),
Village Revolts: Social Protest and Popular Disturbances in England, 1509-1640
(1988), Hunters and Poachers: A Cultural and Social History of Unlawful Hunting
in England, 1485-1640 (1993), Swordsmen: The Martial Ethos in the Three
Kingdoms (2003), An Apprenticeship in Arms: The Origins of the British Army,
1585-1702 (2006), and War and Peace in the Western Political Imagination: From
Classical Antiquity to the Age of Reason (2016).
Bibliography
Primary Sources
An Apologie of the Earle of Essex against those which jealously and maliciously tax him to
be a hinderer of peace and quiet in his country. London: Richard Bradocke, 1663.
Anon. Britanica Triumphalis: A Brief History of the Warres. London,1654.
Bacon, Sir Francis. An Advertisement touching an Holy Warre. In Certain Miscellany
Works. London: Humphrey Robinson, 1629.
Bacon, Sir Francis. Considerations touching a Warre with Spaine and An Advertisement
touching An Holy Warre, Written in 1629. Certaine Miscellany Works of Francis…
Viscount St. Albans, comp. William Rawley. London: Humphrey Robinson, 1661.
Bacon, Sir Francis. De Sapienta Veterum. James Spalding, R.L. Lewis and D.D. Heath
(eds.). Works. 14 vols.; London: Longman, 1857-74; rpr. Stuttgart: F. Fromann
Verlag, 1963.
[Barnes, Thomas.] Vox Belli: or an Alarum to Warre. London: Nathaniel Newberry, 1626.
121 Manning, An Apprenticeship in Arms, ch. 5.
122 Manning, An Apprenticeship in Arms, ch. 6.

Quidditas 41 (2020)

172

Barret, Robert. The Theoricke and Practicke of Moderne Warres. London: William
Ponsonby, 1598.
Bernard, Richard. The Bible-Battells: or, the Sacred Art Militarie. London: Edward
Blackmore, 1629.
Bodin, Jean. The Six Bookes of a Commonweale, ed. K.D. MacRae. 1601; rpr. Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1962.
Boteler, Nathaniel. War Practically Performed: shewing all the Requisites belonging to a
Land-Army. London: Henry Fletcher, 1663.
Brathwait, Richard. The English Gentleman. London, 1630; rpr. Amsterdam: Theatrum
Orbis Terrarum, 1975.
Burnet, Gilbert. Some Passages from the Life and Death… John, Earl of Rochester (1680),
rpr. in Vivian de Sola Pinto (ed.), English Biography of the Seventeenth Century.
London: Harrop, 1951.
The Cabinet-Council: Containing the Chief Arts of Empire and Mysteries of State, in The
Works of Sir Walter Ralegh, comp. Thomas Birch, 2 vols. London: Dodsley, 1751.
Campbell, Archibald, first marquis of Argyll. Instructions to a Son. London: T. Latham,
1661.
Carter, Matthew. Honor Redivius, or An Analysis of Honor and Armory. London: Henry
Herringman, 1660.
Castiglione, Baldasare, Count. The Book of the Courtier, trans. George Bull.
Harmondsworth, Middx.:Penguin, 1976.
Cecil, William, Lord Burleigh. Certain Preceptes or Directions for the Well Ordering and
Carriage of A Man’s Life…Left by a Father to his Sonne at his Death. Edinburgh:
Andro Hart,1618.
Churchill, Sir Winston. Divi Britannica: Being a Remark upon the Lives of all the Kings
of this Isle. London: Thomas Roycroft, 1675.
Clayton, Giles. The Approved Order of Martiall Discipline. London, 1591; rpr.
Amsterdam:Theatrum Orbis Terrarum, 1973.
Craig, Sir Thomas. De Unione Britanniae Tractatus, ed. C.S. Terry. Scottish Historical
Society, 60; Edinburgh, 1909.
Davies, Edward. Military Directions, or the Art of Trayning. London: Edward Griffin,
1618.
D[avies],J[ohn]. The Civil Warres of Great Britain and Ireland: Containing an Exact
History of their Occasion, Origin and Happy End. London: R.W. for Philip Chetwind,
1661.

Quidditas 41 (2020)

173

de Gaya, Louis, sieur de Tréville. Gaya’s Traite des Armes, 1678, ed. Charles Ffoulkes.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1911.
[de la Loque, Bertrand.] Discourses of Warre and Single Combat, trans. John Eliot.
London: John Wolfe, 1591.
de Mandeville, Bernard. An Inquiry into the Origin of Honour and the Usefulness of
Christianity in War. London, 1732: rpr. London: Frank Cass,1971.
de la Noue, François. The Politicke and Militarie Discourses of the Lord De La Nowe.
London: Thomas Cadman and Edward Aggas, 1587.
Digges, Thomas and Dudley. An Arithmeticall Militaire Treatise named Stratioticos.
London: Henrie Bynneman, 1579; rpr. Amsterdam: Theatrum Orbis Terrarum, 1968.
Everard, Thomas. The Arrierereban: A Sermon Preached to the Company of the Military
Yard at St Andrewes, Holborn. London: Thomas Walkley, 1618.
Ferguson, Adam. An Essay on the History of Civil Society, ed. Duncan Forbes. 1767; rpr.
Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1966.
The Foure Bookes of Flavius Vegetius Renatus…of Martiall Policye, Feates of Chivalrie,
and Whatsoever pertaineth to Warre, trans. John Sadler. London: Thomas Marshe,
1572; rpr. Amsterdam: Theatrum Orbis Terrarum, 1968.
Foure Paradoxes, or Politique Discourses…concerning Militarie Discipline…[and]…of
the worthiness of warre and warriors. London: Clement Knight, 1604.
Gosson, Stephen. The Trumpet of Warre: A Sermon Preached at Paul’s Crosse the seventh
of Maie, 1598. London: I.O. at the Sign of the Parrot, 1598.
Greville, Sir Fulke, 1st Lord Brooke. Life of Sir Philip Sidney, ed. Nowell Smith. Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1907; rpr. 1971.
G, H. The Mirrour of Majestie. London: William Jones, 1618.
Gailhard, Jean. The Compleat Gentleman. London: John Starkey, 1678.
Gates, Geoffrey. The Defence of Militarie Profession. London: John Harrison, 1579.
Gouge, William.The Dignitie of Chivalrie, Set Forth in a Sermon preached before the
Artillery Company of London. London: George Miller, 1626.
Gouge, William. God’s Three Arrows: Plague, Famine and the Sword. London: Edward
Brewster, 1631.
Grotius, Hugo. The Law of War and Peace (1625), trans. F.W. Kelsey. Indianapolis: BobbsMerrill, 1925.
Greville, Fulke, 1st Lord Brooke. The Life of the Renowned Sir Philip Sidney. Ed. Alexander
B. Grossart. 4 vols.; 1870. Rpr. New York: HMS Press, 1966.

Quidditas 41 (2020)

174

Gumble, Thomas. The Life of General Monck. London: Thomas Basset, 1671.
[Hales, John.] A Discourse of the Common Weal of the Realm of England (1581), ed.
Elizabeth Lammond. Rpr. New York: Burt Franklin, 1971.
Hampton, William. A Proclamation of Warre from the Lord of Hosts, or England’s Warning
by Israel’s Ruin. London:Matthew Lawe, 1627.
Heyden, Peter. Cyprianus Anglicus: or the History of the Life and Death of the Most
Reverend … William… Lord Archbishop of Canterbury. London: A. Seile, 1688.
Hobbes, Thomas. Behemoth: The History of the Causes of the Civil Wars of England. Ed.
Sir William Molesworth. London, 1682: rpr. New York: Burt Franklin, 1963.
Hobbes, Thomas. Leviathan, ed. W.G. Pogson Smith. London, 1651; rpr. Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1967.
Hyde, Edward, 1st earl of Clarendon. The History of the Rebellion and Civil Wars in
England. Ed. W.D. Macray. 6 vols.; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1888.
Hyde, Edward, 1st earl of Clarendon. “Of War.” A Collection of various Tracts (1727).
Rrpr. In S.V. Makower and B.H. Blackwell (eds.). A Book of English Essays (16001900). London: Oxford University Press, 1917.
Knyvett, Sir Henry. The Defence of the Realme (1596). Rpr. Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1906.
[Leighton, Alexander.] Speculum Belli Sacri: or the Looking Glass of the Holy Warre.
[Amsterdam:] Successors of Giles Thorp, 1624.
Lipsius, Justus. Sixe Bookes of Politickes or Civil Discipline, trans. William Jones. London:
William Ponsonby, 1594.
Lloyd, Lodowick. Stratagems of Jerusalem. London: Thomas Creed, 1602.
Locke, John. Two Treatises of Government (1690), ed. Peter Laslett. Rev. ed,; rpr. New
York: New American Library, 1965.
Lucanus, Marcus Annaeus. The Civil War, Books I-X, trans J.D. Duff. Loeb Classical
Library; Cambridge, Mass.: 1957 rpr. ed.
Lupton, Donald. A Warre-like Treatise of the Pike. London: Richard Hodgkinsonne, 1642.
Machiavelli, Niccolo. The Discourses. Bernard Crick (ed.). Leslie J. Walker (trans.).
Harmondsworth, Middx.: Penguin, 1974.
The Maid of Honour (1632). The Plays and Poems of Philip Massinger. 3 vols.; Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1976.

Quidditas 41 (2020)

175

Markham, Gervase. Honour in his Perfection. London: Benjamin Fisher, 1624.
Markham, Gervase. The Souldier’s Accidence: or, an Introduction into Militarie Discipline.
2nd ed.; London: John Bellamie, 1635.
Markham, Gervase. The Souldier’s Grammar. London: John Bellamie, 1635.
Markham, Gervase. A Myrrour for English Souldiers: Or, An Anotomy of a accomplished
Man at Armes. London: Nicholas Ling, 1595.
Monk, George, duke of Albemarle. Observations upon Military and Political Affairs.
London: Henry Mortlocke et al.,1671.
Mun, Thomas. England’s Treasure by Forraign Trade (1621). London, 1664; rpr. New
York: A.M. Kelley, 1965.
Palmer, Thomas. Bristoll’s Military Garden: A Sermon Preached unto the Worthy
Practioners in the Military Garden of the Well Governed Citie of Bristoll. London:
Felix Kyngston, 1635.
P[rocter], T[homas]. Of the Knowledge and Conducte of Warres. London: Richard Tottell,
1578.
Ralegh Sir Walter. A Discourse of the Original and Fundamental Cause of Natural,
Arbitrary, Necessary, and Unnatural War, in Works. Ed. Thomas Birch. 8 vols.;
London: R. Dodsley, 1751; rpr. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1829.
Rich, Barnabe. Allarme to England foreshewing What Perilles Are Procured where the
people live without regarde of Martiall Lawe. London: C. Barker, 1578.
Rich, Barnabe. The Fruites of long Experience. London: Jeffrey Chorlton, 1604.
Rogers, Francis. A Sermon preached on September the 20. 1632, In the Cathedrall Church
of Christ at Canterbury, at the Funerall of William Proud, a Lieutenant Colonel Slaine
at the late Siege of Mastricke. London: WilliamAdderton, 1633.
Seneca, Lucius Annaeus. “De Providentia,” in Moral Essays III. 4. Loeb Classical Library
edition of the Works of Seneca, trans. John Basore, 1970.
Segar, Sir William. Honor, Military and Civil. London: Robert Barker, 1602.
Sidney, Algernon. Discourses concerning Government. 1698; rpr. New York: Arno Press,
1979.
Sutcliffe, Mathew. The Practice, Proceedings and Lawes of Armes. London: Christopher
Barker, 1593.
Sutton, Thomas. The Good Fight of Faith: A Sermon Preached… unto the gentlemen of the
Artillery Garden. London: Robert Milbourne, 1634.

Quidditas 41 (2020)

176

Sym, John.Life’s Preservative against Self-Killing (1630), ed. Michael MacDonald. Rpr.
London: Routledge, 1988.
Symmons, Edward. A Military Sermon. Oxford, 1644. Brit. Lib., Thomason Tracts, E.53
(19).
Trussel, Thomas. The Souldier Pleading his owne Cause. Furnished with an Argument to
Encourage and Skill to Instruct. 3rd imp.; London: Thomas Walkley, 1626.
Turner, Sir James. Pallas Armata: Military Essays of the Ancient Grecian, Roman and
Modern Art of War. London, 1683; rpr. New York: Greenwood Press, 1968.
Venn, Thomas. Military and Maritime Discipline. London: Robert Paulet, 1672.
Ward, Richard. The Anatomy of Warre with the Wofull Fruits and Effects thereof. London:
John Dalham and Richard Lorends, 1642.
Ward, Robert. Animadversions of Warre: or a Militarie Magazine of the Truest Rules and
Ablest Instructions for the Managing of Warre. London: John Dawson, 1639.
Williams, Sir Roger. A Briefe Discourse of Warre. London: Thomas Orwin, 1590.
Secondary Sources
Aho, James A. Religious Mythology and the Art of War: Comparative Religious Symbolism
of Military Violence. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1989.
Anselment, Raymond A. “Clarendon and the Caroline Myth of Peace,” Journal of British
Studies 23 (1984).
Archer, Ian (comp.), “Gazetteer of Military Levies from the City of London, 1509-1603.”
Online Supplement to “The Burden of Taxation in Sixteenth Century London,”
Historical Journal 44.3 (2001)599-627. Cambridge Journals Online, 045-118.
Baumgartner, Frederic J. Declaring War in Early Modern Europe. New York: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2011.
Black, Jeremy (ed.). “Introduction.”
Edinburgh: J. Donald, 1987.

The Origins of War in Early Modern Europe.

Bradford, Alan T. “Stuart Absolutism and the Utility of Tacitus,” Huntington Library
Quarterly 46 (1983).
Burke, Peter. “Tacitism.” T.A. Dorey (ed.). Tacitus. London: Routledge, 1969.
Cahill, Patricia. Unto the Breech: Martial Formations, Historic Trauma and the Early
Modern Stage.Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008.
Capp, Bernard. Astrology and the Popular Press: English Almanacs, 1500-1800. London:
Faber, 1979.

Quidditas 41 (2020)

177

Carlton, Charles. This Seat of Mars: War and the British Isles, 1485-1746. New Haven:
Yale University Press, 2011.
Clark, Ian. Waging War: A Philosophical Introduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1988.
Clark, Sir George. War and Society in the Seventeenth Century. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1958.
Cogswell, Thomas. The Blessed Revolution: English Politics and the Coming of War.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989.
Cogswell, Thomas. “Underground Verse and the Transformation of Early Stuart Political
Culture.” Susan Amussen and Mark A. Kishlansky (eds.). Political Culture and
Cultural Politics. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1995.
Cox, Richard. Locke on War and Peace. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1960.
Crawford, Patricia. “Charles Stuart, That Man of Blood,” Journal of British History 16.2
(1971).
Cust, Richard. Charles I and the Aristocracy, 1625-1642. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2013.
de Somogyi, Nickolas. Shakespeare’s Theatre of War. Aldershot, Hants.: Ashgate, 1998.
Dewald, Jonathan. Aristocratic Experience and the Origins of Modern Culture: France,
1590-1715. Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1993.
Donagan, Barbara. “Halcyon Days and the Literature of War: England’s Military Education
before 1642,” Past and Present no. 147 (1995).
Ferguson, Arthur B. The Chivalric Tradition in Renaisance England. Cranbury, N.J.:
Associated University Presses, 1986.
Ford, Franklin. Robe and Sword: The Regrouping of the French Aristocracy after Louis
XIV. Cambridge, Mass. Harvard University Press, 1962.
Freeman, James A. Milton and the Martial Muse: Paradise Lost and the European
Tradition of War. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980.
Gajda, Alexandra. “Debating War and Peace in Late Elizabethan England,” Historical
Journal 54.4 (2009).
Gajda, Alexandra. The Earl of Essex and Late Elizabethan Political Culture. Oxford:
Oxford Univerity Press, 2012.

Quidditas 41 (2020)

178

Hale, Sir John. “Armies, Navies and the Art of War,” New Cambridge Modern History,
vol. Ii: The Counter-Reformation and the Price Revolution, 1559-1610, ed. R.B.
Wernham. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968.
Hale, Sir John. “Incitement to Violence? English Divines on the Theme of War,” J.G. Rowe
and W.H. Stockdale (eds.). Florilegium Historiale: Essays Presented to Wallace K.
Ferguson. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1971.
Haller, William. The Rise of Puritanism. New York: Columbia University Press, 1938; rpr.
Harper, 1957.
Hathaway, Michael. “Blood is their Argument: Men of War and Soldiers in Shakespeare
and Others.” Anthony Fletcher and Peter Roberts (eds.). Religion Culture and Society
in Early Modern England. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994.
Hill, Christopher. Intellectual Origins of the English Revolution. Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1965.
Housley, Norman. Religious Warfare in Europe, 1400-1536. Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2002.
Howard, Sir Michael. Weapons and Peace. David Davies Memorial Institute of International
Studies, Annual Memorial Lecture. London, 1983.
Hutton, James. Themes of Peace in Renaissance Poetry. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University
Press, 1984.
Johnson, J.T. Ideology, Reason and the Limitation of War: Religious and Secular Concepts.
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975.
Johnson, J.T. Just War Tradition and the Restraint of War. Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1981.
Jorgenson, Paul A. “Theoretical Views of War in Elizabethan England.” Journal of the
History of Ideas 13 (1952).
Keegan, Sir John. A History of Warfare. New York: Knopf, 1993.
Keen, M.H. The Laws of War in the Late Middle Ages. London: Routledge & K. Paul,
1965.
Kewes, Paula. “Henry Saville’s Tacitus and the Politics of Roman History in Late
Elizabethan England,” Huntington Library Quarterly74.4 (2011).
Lake, Peter. “From Leicester his Commonwealth to Sejanus his Fall: Ben Jonson and
the Politics of Roman (Catholic) Virtue,” in Catholics and the Protestant ‘Nation’:
Religious Politics and Identity in Early Modern England, ed. Ethan Shagan.
Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005.

Quidditas 41 (2020)

179

Lenman, Bruce. England’s Colonial Wars, 1550-1688: Conflicts, Empire and National
Identity. Harlow, Essex: Longman, 2001.
Levy, F. J. Tudor Historical Thought. San Marino, Calif.: Hutington Library, 1967.
Lowe, Ben. Imagining Peace: A History of English Pacifist Ideas.University Park:
Pennsylvania State University Press 1997.
Luciani, Vincent. “Ralegh’s Discourse of War and Machiavelli’s Discorsi.” Modern
Philology 46 (1948).
MacGillivray, Royce. Restoration Historians and the Civil War. The Hague: Martinus
Nijhoff, 1974.
Maclean, Hugh. “Fulke Greville on War,” Huntington Library Quarterly 21 (1958).
McCrea, Adriana. Constant Minds: Political Virtue and the Lipsian Paradigm in
England,1584-1650. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997.
Mallett, Michael. “The Theory and Practice of Warfare in Machiavelli’s Republic.” Gisela
Bock, Quentin Skinner and Marizio Viroli (eds.). Machiavelli and Republicanism.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990.
Manning, Roger B. An Apprenticeship in Arms: The Origins of the British Army. Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2006.
Manning, Roger B. “The Jacobean Peace: The Irenic Policy of James VI and I,” Quidditas
39 (2018).
Manning, Roger B. “Sir John Burgh, 1582-1627,” Notes and Queries 262.3 (Sept. 2017).
Manning, Roger B. Swordsmen: The Martial Ethos in the Three Kingdoms. Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2003.
Manning, Roger B. War and Peace in the Western Political Imagination: From Classical
Antiquity to the Age of Reason. London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2016.
Nolan, John S. “The Militarization of the Elizabethan State,” Journal of Military History
58.3 (1994).
Parker, Geoffrey. “Early Modern Europe.” Michael Howard, George J. Andreopoulos and
Mark R. Schulman (eds.). The Laws of War: Constraints on Warfare in the Western
World. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994.
Pears, Steuart (trans. & ed.). The Correspondence of Sir Philip Sidney and Hubert Languet.
London: W. Pickering, 1845.
Peltonen, Markku. Classical Humanism and Republicanism in English Political Thought,
1570-1640. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995.

Quidditas 41 (2020)

180

Peltonen, Markku. Rhetoric, Politics and Popularity in Pre-Revolutionary England.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013.
Rapple, Rory. Martial Power and Elizabethan Political Culture: Military Men in England
and Ireland, 1558-1594. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009.
Redlich, Fritz. De Praeda Militari: Looting and Booty, 1500-1800. Vierteljahrschrift für
Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte 39, Wiesbaden, 1956.
Scott, Jonathan. “The Law of War: Grotius, Sidney and Locke and the Theory of Rebellion.”
History of Political Thought 13 (1992).
Shepard, Alan. Marlowe’s Soldiers: The Rhetorics of Masculinity in the Age of the Armada.
Aldershot, Hants.: Ashgate, 2002.
Shifflet, Andrew. Stoicism, Politics and Literature in the Age of Milton. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1998.
Silbener, Edmond. La guerre dans la pensée économique du XVIe au XVIIIe siècles. Paris:
Librairie du Recueil Sirey, 1939; rpr. New York: Garland, 1972.
Smuts, Malcolm. “Organized Violence in the Elizabethan Monarchical Republic,” History
99. 336 (20014).
Schwoerer, Lois. Gun Culture in Early Modern England. Charlottesville: University of
Virginia Press, 2016.
Steggle, Matthew. “Essexianism and the Work of Gervase Markham.” Annaliese Connolly
and Lisa Hopkins (eds.). Essex: The Cultural Impact of an Elizabethan Courtier.
Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2013.
Teitler, Gerke. The Genesis of the Professional Officer’s Corps. Beverley Hills, Calif.:
Sage, 1977.
Taunton, Nina. 1590s Drama and Militarism: Portrayals of War in Marlowe, Chapman
and Shakespeare. Aldershot, Hants.: Ashgate, 2001.
Trim, David J.B. “The Context of War and Violence in Sixteenth-Century English Society,”
Journal of Early Modern History 3.3 (1999).
Trim, David J.B. “Introduction.” The Chivalric Ethos and the Development of Military
Professionalism. Leiden: Brill, 2003.
van der Molen, Gesina. Alberico Gentili and the Development of International Law. 2nd
ed.; Leyden: Sijtoff, 1968.
Waggoner, G.R. “An Elizabethan Attitude toward War and Peace.” Philological Quarterly
33 (1954).

Quidditas 41 (2020)

181

Walsam, Alexandra. Providence in Early Modern England. Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1999.
Wells, Robin Headlam. “’Manhood and Chivalrie’: Coriolanus, Prince Henry and the
Chivalric Revival.” The Review of English Studies (2000).
Werner, Hans. The Hector of Germany, or The Palsgrave, Prime Elector and Anglo-German
Relations of Early-Stuart England: the View from the Stage.” R.M. Smuts (ed.). The
Stuart Court and Europe: Essays in Politics and Culture. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1996.
Wernham, R.B. (ed.). The Expedition of Sir John Norris and Sir Francis Drake to Spain
and Portugal, 1589. Naval Records Society, 127; Aldershot, Hants., 1988.
Wootton, David. Paolo Sarpi: Between Renaissance and Enlightenment. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1983.
Worden, Blair. “Ben Jonson among the Historians.” Kevin Sharpe and Peter Lake (eds.).
Culture and Politics in Early Stuart England. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University
Press, 1993.
Younger, Neil. War and Politics in the Elizabethan Counties. Manchester:Manchester
University Press, 2012.

